Lecture 10 - Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes

author: Benjamin Polak, Department of Economics, Yale University
recorded by: Yale University
published: Nov. 15, 2010,   recorded: September 2007,   views: 3185
released under terms of: Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives (CC-BY-ND)
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Description

We develop three different interpretations of mixed strategies in various contexts: sport, anti-terrorism strategy, dating, paying taxes and auditing taxpayers. One interpretation is that people literally randomize over their choices. Another is that your mixed strategy represents my belief about what you might do. A third is that the mixed strategy represents the proportions of people playing each pure strategy. Then we discuss some implications of the mixed equilibrium in games; in particular, we look how the equilibrium changes in the tax-compliance/auditor game as we increase the penalty for cheating on your taxes.

Reading assignment:

Handout on ESS in Pure Strategies

Resources:

Handout on ESS in Pure Strategies [PDF]
Blackboard Notes Lecture 10[PDF]

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