Lecture 9 - Mixed strategies in theory and tennis

author: Benjamin Polak, Department of Economics, Yale University
recorded by: Yale University
published: Nov. 15, 2010,   recorded: September 2007,   views: 3634
released under terms of: Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives (CC-BY-ND)
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Description

We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a mixed strategy is a best response, then all the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be best responses and hence indifferent. We use this idea to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game within a game of tennis.

Reading assignment:

Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice. (Dutta): Chapters 8-9

Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. (Watson): Chapter 11

Thinking Strategically. (Dixit and Nalebuff): Chapter 7

Resources:

Problem Set 4 [PDF]
Handout on Mixed Strategies [PDF]
Blackboard Notes Lecture 9 [PDF]

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