Lecture 6 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot

author: Benjamin Polak, Department of Economics, Yale University
recorded by: Yale University
published: Nov. 15, 2010,   recorded: September 2007,   views: 3990
released under terms of: Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives (CC-BY-ND)
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Description

We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

Reading assignment:

Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice. (Dutta): Chapters 6-7

Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. (Watson): Chapter 10

Thinking Strategically. (Dixit and Nalebuff): Chapter 9, Section 5

Resources:

Blackboard Notes Lecture 6[PDF]

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