Lecture 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships

author: Benjamin Polak, Department of Economics, Yale University
recorded by: Yale University
published: Nov. 15, 2010,   recorded: September 2007,   views: 3948
released under terms of: Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives (CC-BY-ND)
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Description

We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium.

Reading assignment:

Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice. (Dutta): Chapter 5

Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. (Watson): Chapters 6-9

Thinking Strategically. (Dixit and Nalebuff): Chapter 3, Sections 4-6

Resources:

Blackboard Notes Lecture 4[PDF]

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