

# *Incompleteness as a metaphor*

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## *Dedication*

*To the Russian school of Mathematics of the 60's, the generation of my parents, a phenomenon that will never be repeated.*

## References

- 1 Yu.I. Manin. Mathematics as a metaphor. (Selected essays with a foreword by F. Dyson.) AMS, 2007.
- 2 Yu.I. Manin. Truth as value and duty: lessons of mathematics. 2008.
- 3 F. Dyson. Birds and Frogs in Mathematics and Physics. Notices AMS, 2009.
- 4 V.I. Arnold. What is Mathematics? МЦНМО, 2002, 104 p. (in Russian).
- 5 V.A. Uspensky. Apology of Mathematics. Amphora, 2009, 560 p. (in Russian).
- 6 G. Lakoff, R. Núñez. Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. Basic Books, 2000, 493 p.

# Themes

- 1 Arnold, Bourbakists and "Axiomatizers".  
(Is Mathematical Logic part of Mathematics?)
- 2 Manin: Birds and Metaphors.
- 3 Incompleteness as a metaphor.

## *A test: two questions*

Question 1: Is 0 a natural number? (Yes or No, please.)

## *A test: two questions*

**Question 2:** Is Question 1 relevant? (Does it seriously matter, or it is just a matter of convention.)

## *Outcome*

- If you think it is not relevant, you are a bourbakist.
- If you think it matters, you are a follower of Arnold.

(Accidentally, Arnold believed natural numbers begin with 1, but this is not the main point.)

## *Some of Arnold's beliefs*

- Mathematics is part of Physics, in fact, the cheapest one.
- It is an experimental science, like any other natural science.
- Discovering theorems is more important than proving them.
- Examples are important. Cf. I. Gelfand:  
'Theories come and go, the examples remain'.
- Abstract notions (such as groups or manifolds) are irrelevant:  
e.g., any group is just a group of transformations.
- Formalization and axiomatization kills the spirit of mathematics. Hence: the 'axiomatizers' such as Leibnitz, Cauchi, and Hilbert are evil. The good are: Newton, Riemann, and especially Poincaré.
- Logic is not mathematics.



## *Why (I think) mathematical logic is mathematics?*

- Not because it is applicable to problems in mathematics;
- Not because it studies formal systems or provides foundations for mathematics;
- Only because it uses mathematical method: we work like mathematicians, give definitions, prove theorems, etc.;
- Even though a peculiar and fairly isolated kind of mathematics is created in doing it.
- One can be a logician and share Arnold's beliefs (I share some but not all of them). Provided one considers formal systems as a natural phenomenon (part of Physics).

Question: Why do we **want** logic to be part of mathematics?

# Metaphors 1

## Ordinary (poetic) metaphors:

*'A proof is a route, which might be a desert track boring and unimpressive until one finally reaches the oasis of one's destination, or a foot path in green hills, exciting and energizing, opening great vistas of unexplored lands and seductive offshoots, leading far away even after the initial destination point has been reached.'*

(Yu. I. Manin)

## *Metaphors 2*

### Conceptual metaphors

Lakoff & Johnson, 'Metaphors we live by'.

E.g. the words we use:

'Foundations of Mathematics'

'Incompleteness'

## *Metaphors 3*

### Mathematical metaphors (after Manin)

Theory – model – metaphor

'A mathematical metaphor, when it aspires to be a cognitive tool, postulates that some complex range of phenomena might be compared to a mathematical construction'