Financial crises and risk management
Description
The scientific study of complex systems has transformed a wide range of disciplines in recent years, enabling researchers in both the natural and social sciences to model and predict phenomena as diverse as the failure of materials, earthquakes, global warming, demographic patterns, and financial crises. In this talk, Didier Sornette describes a simple, powerful, and general theory of how, why, and when stock markets crash.
Most attempts to explain market failures seek to pinpoint triggering mechanisms that occur hours, days, or weeks before the collapse.
Sornette proposes a radically different view: the underlying cause can be sought months and even years before the abrupt, catastrophic event in the build-up of cooperative speculation, into an accelerating rise of the market price, otherwise known as a "bubble." This view implies the possibility of predicting such events and Sornette will describe the current status of predictions that he and his collaborators have made for events in various markets.
| Slides | |
| 0:00 | FINANCIAL CRISES SYSTEMIC RISKS |
| 4:01 | MOTIVATIONS |
| 6:03 | What are bubbles? How do detect them? How to predict them? |
| 7:56 | The Fed: A. Greenspan |
| 9:36 | An Overview of Speculative Bubbles and Market Crashes |
| 11:26 | Super-exponential growth of the major indices over long time periods |
| 12:20 | Does Stock Price Move Too Much? |
| 14:50 | Proximate explanations after the fact! |
| 16:31 | The Crash of October 1929 |
| 17:59 | The Nasdaq Crash of April 2000 part1 |
| 18:07 | The Nasdaq Crash of April 2000 part2 |
| 21:11 | EXPECTATIONS of strong future growth |
| 23:46 | Foreign capital inflow |
| 25:19 | Various Bubbles and Crashes |
| 28:01 | Many other bubbles and crashes |
| 28:03 | Hang-Seng & Date part1 |
| 28:05 | Hang-Seng & Date part2 |
| 30:39 | Universal Bubble and Crash Scenario |
| 32:39 | Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes (1978) |
| 34:37 | Why are they so difficult to identify? |
| 34:40 | What is the cause of the crash? |
| 35:47 | Standard price dynamics: exponential growth |
| 37:13 | Positive feedbacks and finite-time singularity - Super-exponential growth |
| 39:01 | Super-exponential growth |
| 40:46 | Mechanisms for positive feedbacks in the stock market |
| 42:26 | Super-exponential growth, Index & Date |
| 42:56 | Super-exponential growth, second graph |
| 43:01 | Finite-time Singularity |
| 44:56 | Why are they so difficult to identify? (academic view vs. practitioners vs Fed) |
| 45:24 | Short random runs of news can be amplified into bubbles by herding optimizing traders |
| 46:02 | Opinion formation... |
| 46:04 | Price clearing condition... |
| 46:07 | Graphs |
| 46:08 | NEWS IMPACT |
| 46:46 | Real-estate bubble and MBS bubble |
| 46:59 | Real-estate bubbles |
| 47:15 | Real-estate in the UK |
| 47:39 | Real-estate in the USA |
| 47:48 | Our study in 2005 identifies the bubble states |
| 48:37 | Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy (Nov. 2005) |
| 48:59 | This graph shows the year-over-year price changes for the Case-Shiller |
| 49:05 | Why are they dangerous? Systemic risks |
| 49:06 | Securitisation model |
| 49:46 | Key Players and Frictions in Subprime Mortgage Credit Securitization |
| 50:26 | Securitization of credit risks |
| 51:35 | Subprime financial crisis |
| 51:38 | Separation of financial and credit risks & Securitization leads to larger inter-connectivity |
| 54:46 | SYNCHRONISATION AND COLLECTIVE EFFECTS IN EXTENDED STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS |
| 55:11 | “Phase diagram” |
| 55:42 | “Phase diagram” - four graphs |
| 56:00 | 19 rats treated intravenously (2) with the convulsant 3-mercapto-proprionic acid (3-MPA) |
| 56:42 | What can be done? Better metrics vs. moral hazard and herding |
| 56:46 | “SLAVING OF THE FED TO THE STOCK MARKET |
| 57:56 | Causal Slaving of the U.S. Treasury Bond Yield by the Stock Market Antibubble of August 2000 |
| 58:22 | ARE CRASHES EXCEPTIONAL? |
| 59:00 | Better risk measure: drawdowns |
| 59:56 | Distribution of drawdowns |
| 59:59 | Outliers, Kings |
| 60:27 | Endogenous vs exogenous crashes |
| 62:20 | The bubble and Crash of Oct. 1997 |
| 62:47 | What are bubbles? How do detect them? How to predict them? |
| 64:00 | Hang Seng China Entreprises Index (HSCEI) |
| 66:02 | Speculation vs supply-demand |
| 67:54 | Main Messages |
| 68:31 | - Questions |
| 77:31 | - Questions |
| 77:48 | - Questions |
| 77:59 | - Questions |
| 78:39 | - Questions |
| 89:59 | - Questions |
| 93:29 | Why bubbles are not arbitraged away? |
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I think as long as the speaker does not right each step specially in mathematical statement, the user can not follow what he says and the flow. Every speaker must write. Otherwise he is lazy.
The model proposed by Sornette on positive feedbacks and referenced in http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0... was not of a “Sornette and students” origin as stated by the lecturer.
The original model and the economic theoretical proposal that sustained the rule, including the idea that imitation may be rational, rather than a deviation to rationality, came from Gonçalves, see the following reference:
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/m...
Sornette was way off, thinking that the phase transitions, to an organized state, should be slow, and that the herding was irrational (per noise trader model).
What Sornette and Zhou did do, was propose an extension to Gonçalves’ rule, and call it self-fulfilling Ising model (a name which IMO does not capture the main aspects of the above artificial financial market), solving a problem with the bimodal distribution (as reported by Sornette and Zhou), another solution to that problem was obtained by Gonçalves through the inclusion of other investor species like trend followers and speculators, following Farmer’s previous work:
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/m...
Sornette seems to be assuming credit, for a whole conceptual network on endogenous economic dynamics that has been around for a while. Specifically, Gonçalves' proposal is conceptually linked to Farmer's proposal, Vaga's proposal, Simon's proposal, etc..
It is not at all the case that the financial literature hasn't addressed, before Sornette, many of the issues that Sornette is now addressing regarding endogenous price fluctuations, see the work developed at the SFI, and the work of the economic chaologists.
Sornette should really do his homework and reference properly the literature that has come before him, his work is not an island, nor does it stand alone without a bulk of intellectual production within economics and financial economics that has been around for a while now (for at least twenty years actually (twenty years is a lot of research!)).
As a final note, as far as I read both the works of Sornette and the works of Gonçalves as well as the works that have since been developed on the artificial financial market Netlogo models, by research teams other than Sornette’s, there is a failure by Sornette and Zhou in understanding several of the fundamental aspects of these models, in part, stemming from a failure to understand the concept of rationality.
COMPLEMENTARY LOGISTIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS
Beside the TRILLIONS committed for all the multiple rescue plans, a necessary complementary strategic & logistic intervention become imperative to put some order in this crisis of total financial anarchy at all stages. We are all aware now that most figures and values, are unreliable, uncertain, and at best unmeasurable……….
HOW CAN ANYONE TRUST, EVALUATE, ASSESS, UNDERSTAND, ANALYSE, CONTROL, MANAGE, AUDIT, REGULATE, RATE OR RESCUE IN THIS CHAOTIC ENVIRONMENT???
Urgently required a new modern technologically advanced open Decision making Process of Management Information System (MIS) with live monitoring smart GRID +NETWORK supported by Multiplatform system with Multidimensional TOOLS to accurately reflect permanent live REALITIES.
MAURICE
As a geology expert Sornette learned that quake prediction was similar to stock market prediction. Mandelbrot noted similarities in "statistics of extreme values" or fractal geometry or chaos theory for PHYSICAL processes, turbulence in ocean streams and cotton prices They all agree that the older efficient market models missed some long term memory effects, autocorrelation as some say, or in short term "herding" rather than independent data, and that any power law time series is unsustainable LONG TERM, thus bubbles are inevitable but unpredictable in detail. Many books and PhD theses on these economic and financial pricing models (and quake prediction). The problem is that ADVISORS selling IRA's use a much MILDER risk metric than that which would be predicted from the price variation distribution with FATTER TAILS than the normal bell curve. Sadly.