Internet Advertising and Optimal Auction Design

author: Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Research
published: Dec. 20, 2008,   recorded: December 2008,   views: 265
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Description

This talk describes the optimal (revenue maximizing) auction for sponsored search advertising. We show that a search engine's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders. Using simulations, we consider the changes that result from a search engine's choice of reserve price and from changes in the number of participating advertisers.

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