Machine Learning, Market Design, and Advertising
published: Dec. 20, 2008, recorded: December 2008, views: 820
Report a problem or upload filesIf you have found a problem with this lecture or would like to send us extra material, articles, exercises, etc., please use our ticket system to describe your request and upload the data.
Enter your e-mail into the 'Cc' field, and we will keep you updated with your request's status.
Given the complexity of preferences in markets such as key word advertising it is hard to believe that the de facto standard, decentralized, local, greedy algorithm (advertisers bid for clicks on keywords) is any where close to being optimal for any reasonable objective (welfare, profit, etc.). In this talk we consider the market design problem from a global perspective. We make connections between machine learning theory and market design theory, where machine learning design problems closely mirror game theoretic design problems. We reduce a general theoretical market design problem to a natural machine learning optimization problem. These theoretical results lead to a number of practical answers to advertising market design questions.
Link this pageWould you like to put a link to this lecture on your homepage?
Go ahead! Copy the HTML snippet !