Incentive Engineering in the Internet Age

author: David C. Parkes, Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University
published: Sept. 1, 2010,   recorded: July 2010,   views: 184
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Mechanism design provides a formalism within which to understand the possible and the impossible when designing multi-agent systems with private information and rational agents. In introducing computational considerations, we have gained some understanding of how to reconcile new tensions that arise. Today, we see a thirst for practical, engineered incentive mechanisms to deploy across the myriad of multiuser systems enabled by the Internet. I will highlight some of the new challenges that this presents, in moving from isolated events to continual processes, from simple models to complex, multifaceted agent models, and in enabling new kinds of computational and coordination processes.

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