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One Equilibrium Is Not Enough: Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions to Act Strategically
Published on Aug 23, 20113769 Views
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Chapter list
One Equilibrium Is Not Enough: Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions to Act Strategically00:00
Multiple entities with different interests - 100:08
Multiple entities with different interests - 200:20
Multiple entities with different interests - 300:43
Multiple entities with different interests - 400:54
Multiple entities with different interests - 501:05
Multiple entities with different interests - 601:18
Multiple entities with different interests - 701:29
Multiple entities with different interests - 801:32
Multiple entities with different interests - 901:37
Closer to home ... - 101:47
Closer to home ... - 201:51
Closer to home ... - 302:09
Closer to home ... - 402:20
Closer to home ... - 502:55
Closer to home ... - 603:09
Microeconomic Theory - 103:36
Microeconomic Theory - 203:51
Some microeconomic theory tools for AI - 103:55
Some microeconomic theory tools for AI - 204:14
Some microeconomic theory tools for AI - 304:23
Some microeconomic theory tools for AI - 404:50
Penalty kick example - 104:58
Penalty kick example - 205:28
Penalty kick example - 305:35
Penalty kick example - 405:41
Penalty kick example - 505:51
Penalty kick example - 605:59
Penalty kick example - 706:18
Penalty kick - 106:38
Penalty kick - 207:17
Security example - 107:31
Security example - 207:43
Security game - 107:59
Security game - 208:18
Recent deployments in security08:29
“Should I buy an SUV?” - 109:18
“Should I buy an SUV?” - 209:55
“Should I buy an SUV?” - 310:27
“Should I buy an SUV?” - 410:53
“Should I buy an SUV?” - 511:02
“Chicken”12:01
Nash equilibrium - 112:52
Nash equilibrium - 212:58
Nash equilibrium - 313:01
Nash equilibrium - 413:02
Nash equilibrium - 513:03
Nash equilibrium - 613:10
Nash equilibrium - 713:10
The presentation game - 113:13
The presentation game - 214:10
The presentation game - 314:28
The presentation game - 414:29
The presentation game - 514:36
Modeling and representing games - 114:39
Modeling and representing games - 214:53
Modeling and representing games - 315:01
Modeling and representing games - 415:14
Modeling and representing games - 515:20
Modeling and representing games - 615:26
Modeling and representing games - 715:28
Computing a single Nash equilibrium - 115:37
Computing a single Nash equilibrium - 216:13
Computing a single Nash equilibrium - 316:19
Computing a single Nash equilibrium - 416:46
Computing a single Nash equilibrium - 516:53
A useful reduction (SAT → game) - 117:08
A useful reduction (SAT → game) - 217:25
A useful reduction (SAT → game) - 317:29
Some algorithm families for computing Nash equilibria of 2-player normal-form games - 118:24
Some algorithm families for computing Nash equilibria of 2-player normal-form games - 218:42
Some algorithm families for computing Nash equilibria of 2-player normal-form games - 319:01
Some algorithm families for computing Nash equilibria of 2-player normal-form games - 419:08
Sidestepping the problems - 119:37
Sidestepping the problems - 220:04
Nash is not optimal if one player can commit - 120:11
Nash is not optimal if one player can commit - 220:34
Nash is not optimal if one player can commit - 320:45
Nash is not optimal if one player can commit - 420:47
Nash is not optimal if one player can commit - 520:50
Nash is not optimal if one player can commit - 620:59
Commitment to mixed strategies - 121:23
Commitment to mixed strategies - 221:27
Commitment to mixed strategies - 321:36
Commitment to mixed strategies - 421:56
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 122:02
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 222:20
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 322:25
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 422:25
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 522:26
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 622:26
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 722:34
Observing the defender’s distribution in security - 822:43
Computing the optimal mixed strategy to commit to - 122:58
Computing the optimal mixed strategy to commit to - 223:15
Computing the optimal mixed strategy to commit to - 323:32
Computing the optimal mixed strategy to commit to - 423:40
Computing the optimal mixed strategy to commit to - 523:53
Computing the optimal mixed strategy to commit to - 623:57
Other nice properties of commitment to mixed strategies - 124:02
Other nice properties of commitment to mixed strategies - 224:07
Other nice properties of commitment to mixed strategies - 324:13
Other nice properties of commitment to mixed strategies - 424:20
Some other work on commitment in unrestricted games - 124:31
Some other work on commitment in unrestricted games - 224:44
Some other work on commitment in unrestricted games - 324:59
Some other work on commitment in unrestricted games - 425:01
Security resource allocation games - 125:07
Security resource allocation games - 225:19
Security resource allocation games - 325:28
Security resource allocation games - 425:36
Security resource allocation games - 525:48
Security resource allocation games - 625:54
Security resource allocation games - 725:59
Game-theoretic properties of security resource allocation games - 126:15
Game-theoretic properties of security resource allocation games - 226:27
Game-theoretic properties of security resource allocation games - 326:43
Game-theoretic properties of security resource allocation games - 427:01
Game-theoretic properties of security resource allocation games - 527:02
Scalability in security games - 127:32
Scalability in security games - 228:00
Scalability in security games - 328:20
Scalability in security games - 428:24
Scalability in security games - 528:57
In summary: AI pushing at some of the boundaries of game theory29:16
Funding30:39
Academic family30:47
AI at Duke31:28
Family31:52