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Designing Online Advertising Markets
Published on Aug 23, 20119774 Views
Research focuses on marketplace design, auction theory, and the statistical analysis of auction data.
Related categories
Chapter list
Designing Online Advertising Markets00:00
Introduction01:19
Auction-Based Two-Sided Markets05:13
What Matters in Market Design for a Platform Market?14:48
Market design v. Mechanism Design18:39
Influencing Market Design20:41
The Role of Data and Experimentation25:40
Search Advertising Auctions29:41
Current Auction Format33:55
Generalized Second Price Auction with Click-Weighting34:00
Why a real-time auction?37:43
Why a pay-per click (PPC) auction? - 137:44
Why a pay-per click (PPC) auction? - 237:44
Click-weighted auctions37:45
Extending Theory to Incorporate Platform Economics41:09
Athey-Ellison Results43:50
Consumer, Advertiser Participation Exogenous (Monopoly Platform)46:57
Competition Reduces Reserve Prices48:32
A Structural Model for Counterfactual Analysis49:32
Advertiser Order Database, Delivery Engine, Scoring Algorithm49:40
Reformulate Problem49:41
Estimates of AC(q), MC(q), and implied value for a high-value search phrase49:41
Model Predictions Out of Sample53:35
Bid Shading, Profits Per Click Vary by Position53:36
GSP is inefficient; Revenue Comparison Ambiguous53:41
“Squashing” Raises Revenue Substantially at Modest Efficiency Cost55:29
Short-Term Effects Smaller than Long-Term Limitation to Short-Term Experiments56:50
Conclusions57:31