Lecture 17 - Distributive Justice and the Welfare State

author: Ian Shapiro, Yale University
recorded by: Yale University
published: Aug. 19, 2014,   recorded: March 2011,   views: 1454
released under terms of: Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives (CC-BY-ND)
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The main focus of today's discussion is Rawls's third and most problematic principle, the difference principle, which states that income and wealth is to be distributed "to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individual." This stems from the logic that what is good for the least advantaged individual will be good for the second-least advantaged, and the third, and so on. But what if slightly benefiting the least advantaged person comes at a huge cost to others? Professor Shapiro explores Rawls's defense. It is important to note that Rawls is not trying to give marginal policy advice, or even determine whether socialism or capitalism benefits the least advantaged (which he leaves to empirics), but trying to determine the basic structure of society. However, Professor Shapiro shows that the difference principle is not necessarily radical in the redistributive sense when compared with Pareto or Bentham, but it is radical in a philosophical sense. Rawls argues that the differences between individuals are morally arbitrary--it's moral luck that determines the family one is born into, what country one is born in, or one's capacities. However, some of the consequences are unsavory. Although Rawls tries in vain to exclude what one chooses to make of one's capacities, could not effort, or capacity to work, fall into this sphere as well? What is to be said of two equally intelligent people, one of who works hard and gets A's while the other lies on the couch and watches ESPN all day?

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